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A FORK IN THE STREAM:
THE UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE CONCURRENCE IN J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY
LTD. V. NICASTRO TO CLARIFY THE STREAM OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
Cody Jacobs*
I.

Introduction
A foreign manufacturer sells a product to an American distributor in State A, who then

resells the product to an American consumer in State B. The consumer is injured by the product
and attempts to sue the foreign manufacturer in State B. Can State B exercise personal
jurisdiction over the manufacturer? This deceptively simple and seemingly common question,
and related questions involving the so-called ‘stream of commerce’ have fractured the United
States Supreme Court for over 20 years, leaving consumers, manufacturers and distributors
unsure of their rights and potential liabilities. This article is about a recent missed opportunity
the Court had to solve that problem, and why two of its Members erred in declining to do so.

In 1987, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,1 the Court split four to four on
the level of ‘purposeful availment’ of a particular state’s laws a foreign manufacturer must
engage in to trigger the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer. Two
opinions for four Justices each presented competing approaches to this problem. One approach
allowed jurisdiction to be asserted whenever a manufacturer placed its wares into the stream of
commerce with the knowledge or expectation that those goods were likely to end up in a

*Staff Attorney, Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2010. I would like
to thank Nitin Reddy of Sidley Austin LLP for providing valuable comments on early drafts of this article. I would
also like to express my appreciation for my wife’s constant support during the long process of getting this article
written. The views expressed in this article are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my
current or former employers. Copyright held by the DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal (forthcoming
2014).
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particular state. Another approach required ‘something more’ before jurisdiction could be
asserted to show that the manufacturer specifically intended to target the forum at issue. This
split left lower courts without clear guidance on this issue and created uncertainty for litigators
and companies in an area of the law that was already without many ‘bright line’ rules.

In 2011, it seemed as if the Court was going to finally clear up this ambiguity in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,2 a case with facts roughly similar to the question presented
in Asahi. However, the Court again could not come up with five votes for one particular test. A
plurality of four Justices essentially supported the ‘something more’ approach, while a dissent
for three Justices supported something akin to the ‘knowledge or expectation’ approach outlined
in Asahi. Justices Breyer and Alito, concurring in the judgment, declined to choose between
these competing approaches because they felt Nicastro presented an inappropriate vehicle to
decide this issue since it did not concern issues of modern technology, such as issues raised by
the internet.

This article critiques that concurrence by arguing that either of the competing approaches to
the stream of commerce test presented in Asahi and reiterated in Nicastro would be preferable to
the current uncertainty in this area of the law. This article argues that modern technology does
not significantly change the calculus in this area because a relatively well-established test for
evaluating internet ‘contacts’ already exists and would be largely unaffected by the choice
between the two approaches to the stream of commerce doctrine. Part II describes the history of
the Supreme Court’s modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence starting with International Shoe
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and ending with Asahi. Specifically, it focuses on the development of two principles in personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence during this time period and the tension between those two concepts:
the requirement of purposeful availment and the expansion of the stream of commerce test. Part
III examines Nicastro itself and the reaction to that decision. Part IV discusses why a clear rule
is particularly desirable and important in this area both for practical reasons and for doctrinal
consistency with other due process clause jurisprudence. Part V explains why the concerns
expressed by the Nicastro concurrence about modern technology should not be an impediment to
choosing between the two competing approaches to the stream of commerce theory. Finally,
Part VI concludes with the hope that the next time the Supreme Court confronts this issue; a
majority of Justices will be able to choose one of these approaches to provide a little more clarity
for companies, consumers, litigators, and courts.

II.

History Of The Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence And The Stream Of
Commerce Theory

In the years leading up the Court’s 1987 decision in Asahi, two trends emerged that
seemed to be at loggerheads with each other. On the one hand, the Court consistently required
some sort of intent on the part of the defendant to avail itself of the forum before personal
jurisdiction could be exercised.3 At the same time, the scope of personal jurisdiction expanded
to adapt to the realities of the rapidly expanding national and global marketplace4 and some
lower courts advocated a “steam of commerce” test whereby the act of placing a chattel into the
3
4

See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75.

See Lindy Burris Arwood, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping Up with (Internet) Traffic?, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 967, 997-98 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s expansion of personal jurisdiction in the second
half of the twentieth century in response to the modern market place and modern technology).

stream of commerce where it was likely to end up in a particular forum was enough to subject a
defendant to jurisdiction in that forum.5

The Court had an opportunity to reconcile these issues in Asahi, but instead produced a
fractured opinion, with four Justices favoring a stricter test of purposeful availment6 and four
Justices favoring adoption of a broad version of the “stream of commerce” test.7

a. Background

Modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence began with the famous case of International
Shoe v. Washington.8 There, the defendant, a Delaware corporation, hired a team of salesmen to
sell shoes in Washington.9 The state of Washington sought to collect certain taxes from the
defendant and the defendant refused arguing, among other things, that it was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Washington.10

5

See Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised
Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243, 259 (1989) (“Under this standard, as liberally interpreted, jurisdiction was upheld not
only over manufacturers who intentionally marketed their products in the forum but over manufacturers who merely
knew or should have known that their products would or could reach the forum.”).
6

480 U.S. at 112 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.).

7

Id. at 116-18 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

8

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

9

Id. at 313-14.

10

Id. at 312-14.

The Court used this case to move away from traditional rules of personal jurisdiction that
only allowed the assertion of jurisdiction when a defendant was physically present in a forum.11
Instead, the Court turned the focus to whether a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”12 In the context of corporate defendants the Court noted that whether
the Due Process Clause allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction “must depend . . . upon the
quality and nature of the activity [engaged in by the corporation in the forum] in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
[sic] to ensure.”13 The Court went on to hold that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper in that
case because the defendant’s operations in Washington had “resulted in a large volume of
interstate business, in the course of which [the defendant] received the benefits and protections”
of the laws of Washington, and “the current suit arose out of those very activities.”14

In the years since International Shoe, the Court refined the test for personal jurisdiction
into one having two distinct requirements. First, the defendant must have sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum to avail itself of the laws of the forum.15 For corporate defendants, these
sorts of contacts typically involve things such as having offices in the forum, conducting

11

Id. at 316.

12

Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940))

13

326 U.S. at 319.

14

Id. at 320.

15

See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (contacts for
purposes of personal jurisdiction are “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”).

business in the forum, sending employees to the forum or advertising in the forum.16 Second,
even if minimum contacts are established, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be consistent
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”17 “[T]he reasonableness of the
exercise of jurisdiction in each case . . . depend[s] on an evaluation of several factors[:]” the
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
relief.18 A court must also consider “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.”19

The Supreme Court has also delineated two different types of personal jurisdiction,
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.20 General jurisdiction allows a state to hear any
and all claims against a corporation, whether or not those claims are connected to the state’s
contacts with the state.21 A showing that general jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign
corporation requires that the corporation have “affiliations with the State [which] are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum state.”22 This is a

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1984) (examining a corporation’s
contacts with a state including purchases supplies from the state, sending an executive to the state to negotiate a deal
and sending employees to the state for trainings); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (noting the defendant’s lack of
advertising in the forum, offices in the forum or business conducted in the forum).
16

17

See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.

18

Id.

19

Id. (quoting World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).

20

See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 2853-54 (2011);
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn. 8, 9.
21

See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851.

22

Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).

high bar,23 and the Supreme Court has found the exercise of general jurisdiction appropriate in
only a single case in the sixty-five years since International Shoe was decided.24 Perhaps in part
because of the difficult standard required for general jurisdiction, after “the emergence of
specific jurisdiction in the twentieth century, the exercise of general jurisdiction has become
rare.”25

Specific jurisdiction arises when the claim against the defendant is connected to the
defendant’s activities within the forum.26 Specific jurisdiction is triggered when (1) the
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,”27 which gives rise to a court’s
ability to adjudicate “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction.”28 It is in these sorts of cases that the controversy over the “stream of
commerce” test has arisen.29

23

See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the standard for
general jurisdiction "is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a
defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.")
That case was Perkins v. Benguet Bonsol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), where the Court upheld Ohio’s
exercise of general jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation where the company was essentially run from Ohio
during World War II. Id. at 437, 447-48.
24

25

See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988); see also Taylor
Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 130 (2012)
(opining that Goodyear represented “the final nail into the coffin of the doctrine of general personal jurisdiction.”)
26

See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2854 (collecting cases).

27

See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

28

See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851.

29

Cf. id. at 2855 (noting that the stream of commerce test is relevant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry, not general
jurisdiction).

b. Purposeful Availment

Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hanson v. Denckla, the Court has
required that, in order to be subject to specific jurisdiction, a defendant must engage in “some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum.”30 In Hanson, a woman living in Pennsylvania executed a deed of trust making a
Delaware trust company the trustee of some of her assets.31 Several years after executing the
trust, the woman moved to Florida, where she later died.32 Upon her death, one of the
beneficiaries of her will brought a declaratory judgment action in Florida seeking to have the
trust voided.33 The beneficiaries of the trust argued that the Florida court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company, an indispensible party.34

The Supreme Court held that Florida courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
the Delaware trust company.35 The Court noted that although it may have been relatively easy
for the defendant to respond to this suit, the restrictions placed on jurisdiction by the Due Process
Clause “are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.”36
Instead, the Clause requires that “the defendant purposefully avail itself of the privilege of

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see, e.g. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-76 (noting the Court’s frequent reliance on the
purposeful availment requirement from Hanson).
30

31

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.

32

Id. at 239.

33

Id. at 240-41.

34

Id. at 240-42.

35

Id. at 251.

36

See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”37 Here, the Court found that the trust company had virtually no contacts with Florida at
all other than the decedent’s decision to move there after creating the trust.38 “The unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State.”39

The Supreme Court continued its focus on the defendant’s actions and intentions in
World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.40 There, a family bought a car from a dealership in New
York and later drove the car across the country where they got in a car accident in Oklahoma and
the car caught on fire, injuring the family.41 The family sued the car dealership and the
distributor of the car (also based in New York, which distributed cars in New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut)42 in a products liability action in Oklahoma state court.43 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction was appropriate, despite the lack of contacts
between the defendants and Oklahoma, because a car, “by its very design and purpose” is
mobile, so the defendants could foresee that it could end up in Oklahoma.44

37

Id. at 253.

38

Id. at 251.

39

Id.

40

444 U.S. 286 (1980).

41

Id. at 288.

42

The plaintiffs also sued the manufacturer of the car, a German corporation, and its importer, however neither of
those parties challenged the assertion of personal jurisdiction over them by the Oklahoma court. See id. at 288 &
n.3.
43

44

Id.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978).

The Supreme Court rejected this approach and held that the defendants were not subject
to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.45 The Court noted that “foreseeability alone has never
been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”46 The
Court argued that because it is foreseeable that all kinds of products could be moved after they
are sold that adopting an approach focused on foreseeability would result in “[e]very seller of
chattels[,] . . . in effect[,] appoint[ing] the chattel his agent for service of process.”47

The Court explained, however, that foreseeability did have an important role in the
personal jurisdiction inquiry:

This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the
“orderly administration of the laws," International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S., at 319, gives a degree of predictability to
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their

45

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.

46

Id. at 259 (quotations omitted).

47

Id. at 296.

primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.48

Thus, the Court held that here, since the defendants did not take any action to avail themselves of
Oklahoma’s laws that would put them on notice that they could be subject to suit there, personal
jurisdiction could not be asserted.49

c. The Stream of Commerce Theory

At the same time the Court was focusing on the intentions of the defendant, however, it
was also expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction in recognition of evolving commerce and
technology. The Court explicitly acknowledged this trend in McGee v. International Life
Insurance,50 where the Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by California courts over a nonresident insurance company where that company had entered into an insurance contract with a
California resident and that contract was the subject of the litigation, even where the company
had no other contacts with California.51 After describing the recent history of the Court’s
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence the Court noted:

Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
48

Id. at 297 (citations omitted).

49

Id.

50

355 U.S. 220 (1957).

51

Id. at 223.

jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In
part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years. Today many commercial
transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization
of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity.52

The Court’s acknowledgement of the influence of technology on commerce is even more striking
in light of the fact that McGee was decided in 1957.53

Building off of this acknowledgement, the Supreme Court of Illinois first enunciated the
stream of commerce test in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.54 In that case,
the defendant, an Ohio corporation, sold a safety valve to a company in Pennsylvania which
incorporated the valve into its water heater, and then sold that heater to a consumer in Illinois.55
The water heater exploded and injured the consumer, and the consumer brought a product

52

Id. at 222-23.

See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“The historical developments noted in McGee of course, have only
accelerated in the generation since that case was decided”).
53

176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); see also, e.g., Murphy, supra note 5, at 256 (noting that Gray is “the case from which the
stream of commerce theory originated”).
54

55

176 N.E.2d at 764.

liability action against the defendant in Illinois state court.56 The defendant argued that it had
insufficient contacts with Illinois to be subject to personal jurisdiction there.57

The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it was sufficient for personal
jurisdiction purposes if “the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with the
State.”58 The court began its analysis by examining recent Supreme Court cases, including
McGee, as well as recent cases from other states expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction to
account for modern business practices.59 Then, the court explained the rationale for the stream
of commerce theory:

With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other States. The
fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one,
however, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of
his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action
arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of
such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient

56

Id. at 762. The defendant apparently had no other contacts with the state of Illinois, but the court did observe that
it was a “reasonable inference” that some of its products (other than the particular valve at issue) ended up being
substantially used and consumed within Illinois. See id. at 764, 766.
57

Id. at 762.

58

Id. at 764.

59

Id. at 764-66.

contact with this State to justify a requirement that he defend
here.60

Thus, the court held that the defendant could be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois
because it could have reasonably assumed that the water heater containing its valves would be
sold in Illinois.61

Many courts subsequently adopted Gray’s approach, and focused on whether or not it
was foreseeable that a product put into the stream of commerce would end up in the place where
the injury occurred.62 However, other courts were reluctant to adopt it, or at least to go as far as
Gray had because of the Supreme Court’s requirement in Hanson that a defendant purposefully
avail itself of the forum.63

The Supreme Court’s decision in World Wide Volkswagen appeared to clear up some of
the confusion by rejecting total reliance on foreseeability.64 However, the Court also seemed to
implicitly endorse at least some version of the stream of commerce test:

60

Id. at 766.

61

See id. at 766.

62

Murphy, supra note 5, at 259 & nn. 77,78,79.

63

Id. at 260 (citing Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978))
(rejecting jurisdiction in Arkansas over an Italian corporation whose product reached Arkansas through a British
intermediary, in part because there was no showing that the defendant had intentionally availed itself of Arkansas’
laws)).
64

See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97; see also Part II(b), supra.

Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . .
is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of
the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to
others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State. Cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961).65

Without any explanation of what was meant by “expectation” in the context of the stream of
commerce, the Court’s opinion in World Wide Volkswagen left the fate of the stream of
commerce theory unclear.66

d. Asahi

The Court had an opportunity to clarify things in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court.67 There, one of the defendants, a Japanese corporation (Asahi) which manufactured tire
65

World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (emphasis added).

66

See Murphy, supra note 5, at 270.

67

480 U.S. 102 (1987).

valve assemblies, sold its products to a tire manufacturer in Taiwan which sold its tires in
California.68 One of the tires was involved in a motorcycle accident in California and the
plaintiff sued the Taiwanese manufacturer, which in turn sued Asahi seeking indemnification.69
The Supreme Court of California upheld jurisdiction over Asahi because, although Asahi had no
contacts with California, it had intentionally placed its products into the stream of commerce
with the awareness that some of the components would eventually be sold in California.70

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.71 An eight Justice majority,72 in an opinion
by Justice O’Connor, held that, whether or not Asahi had sufficient minimum contacts with
California to satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, exercising jurisdiction in
this context would not be consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
as required by the second prong.73 The Court noted that while it would be very inconvenient for
Asahi to defend itself in California, the state of California and the plaintiff (the Taiwanese
company) had only a “slight” interest in adjudicating the suit in California.74 The Court’s
agreement, however, ended there.

68

Id. at 106.

69

Id. at 106.

70

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 550 (1985).

71

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108.

72

Justice Scalia did not join this portion of the opinion.

73

Id. at 113.

74

Id. at 114-15.

In a portion of her opinion joined by three other Justices,75 Justice O’Connor rejected the
expansive version of the stream of commerce theory exemplified by the California Supreme
Court’s decision.76 She stressed that the minimum contacts that give rise to personal jurisdiction
“must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”77
Given that principle, this group of Justices would have held that “a defendant’s awareness that
the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the
forum state.”78 Instead, a defendant must exhibit “[a]dditional conduct” to indicate an intent or
purpose to serve the market in the forum state such as advertising in the forum or designing a
product for the market in that forum.79 Since Asahi had exhibited no such additional conduct,
Justice O’Connor would have found its contacts with California insufficient to satisfy due
process.80

Justice Brennan, in an opinion also joined by three other Justices,81 sharply disagreed
with Justice O’Connor’s approach.82 This group of Justices argued that because “[t]he stream of
commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale,” a lawsuit in a forum where a final
75

Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia.

76

Id. at 112 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.).

77

Id. (emphasis in original).

78

Id.

79

480 U.S. at 112.

80

Id. at 112-13.

81

Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun.

82

See id. at 116-18 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.).

product was being marketed “cannot come as a surprise” to a defendant manufacturer of
component parts like Asahi.83 Justice Brennan noted, echoing the court in Gray, that a
manufacturer who places its product into the stream of commerce in this manner “indirectly
benefits from the [forum] State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.”84 Thus,
he concluded that because Asahi was aware of the distribution system that carried its valves into
California and knew that that distribution system would benefit it economically, sufficient
minimum contacts had been established for California to assert jurisdiction over Asahi under the
first prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.85

Justice Stevens, although he said he was “inclined” to agree with Justice Brennan’s
conclusion, did not join either opinion because the determination of the minimum contacts issue
was unnecessary to the decision in the case in light of the majority’s conclusion that asserting
jurisdiction here was not in accord with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.86

Thus, Asahi did not reconcile the stream of commerce test with the purposeful availment
requirement. Following Asahi, lower courts were left to choose for themselves whether to follow
Justice Brennan’s approach, Justice O’Connor’s approach or some combination of the two.

83

Id. at 117.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 121.

See id. at 121-22 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Justice Stevens’ opinion was also joined by Justices White and
Blackmun.
86

Unsurprisingly, this created a split in authority, with a fairly even number of courts applying
each approach and several courts trying to apply both approaches.87

III.

Nicastro

After Asahi, it would be another twenty-four years before the Court revisited the stream
of commerce test.88 Finally, the Court took an opportunity to address this issue in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.89

The facts of Nicastro were fairly straightforward. The plaintiff was injured while using a
metal recycling machine at his workplace in New Jersey.90 The manufacturer of the machine
was a company incorporated in the United Kingdom.91 That company sold the machine at issue
to its distributor in the United States, based in Ohio, which then sold the machine to the
plaintiff’s New Jersey employer.92 Although the manufacturer had no direct contacts with New
Jersey, its president had attended several trade shows in Nevada to promote the machine, one of
87

See Dustin Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 115-116 & nn. 60, 61, 62 (2012)
(collecting cases applying each approach and avoiding the question). Some courts and commentators refer to Justice
O’Connor’s approach as the “stream of commerce-plus” approach and refer to Justice Brennan’s approach simply as
the “stream of commerce” theory. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the “stream of commerce plus” approach and noting the varying approaches other
courts have taken).
88

In fact, the Court barely addressed personal jurisdiction issues at all during this period, with the exception being
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), where a divided Court affirmed the assertion of
jurisdiction over a defendant who had insufficient minimum contacts with the state under International Shoe, but
was physically present in the state when he was served with process.
89

564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).

90

Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).

91

Id. at 577.

92

Id. at 578.

which was attended by a representative from the plaintiff’s employer.93 The plaintiff sued both
the distributor94 and the manufacturer in New Jersey state court, but the manufacturer argued that
it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.95

The Supreme Court of New Jersey found that New Jersey courts could exercise
jurisdiction over the manufacturer.96 First, the court noted that the manufacturer did not have
any contacts with New Jersey that would ordinarily justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
so the exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer “must sink or swim with the stream of
commerce theory of jurisdiction.”97 Next, the court surveyed the history of the United States
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as well as its own, and noted “[t]he
expanding reach of a state court’s jurisdiction, as permitted by due process, has reflected . . .
historical developments” in the nature of the economy and technology.98 Against this backdrop,
the court reaffirmed earlier New Jersey law following Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion; “[a]
foreign manufacturer will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if it knows or reasonably should
know that through its distribution scheme its products are being sold in New Jersey.”99
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Id. at 579.
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The distributor apparently filed for bankruptcy before the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred and, as of the
date of the Supreme Court’s opinion “ha[d] not participated in th[e] lawsuit.” See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2796 n.2
(GINSBURG, J. dissenting). The fact that the distributor was bankrupt, leaving the plaintiff potentially without
anyone to seek recovery from in New Jersey, or even anywhere in the United States, was an issue of concern to
some Justices at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12:11-13:1, Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (No. 091343).
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Under that rule, the court found that if “[a] manufacturer that knows . . . its products are
distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products to be sold
in any [state] must expect that it will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its . . .
products is sold to a New Jersey consumer[.]”100 Thus, the Court concluded that J. McIntyre
knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution system might lead to its products
entering New Jersey because representatives from the national distributor and the manufacturer
attended trade shows in various cities around the country (albeit not in New Jersey).101 The
Court reasoned that it was clear that those attending these trade shows came from areas other
than the cities hosing those events, meaning that while “J. McIntyre may not have known the
precise destination of [each of its products,] it clearly knew or should have known that its
products were intended for sale and distribution to customers located anywhere in the United
States.”102 Therefore, the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
was permissible.

In a spirited dissenting opinion, Justice Hoens sharply criticized the majority for
misconstruing both Asahi opinions and prior New Jersey law to effectively render “any effort by
a manufacturer to sell its product anywhere in the nation as the only act needed for assertion of . .
. jurisdiction.”103 The dissent argued that the majority’s analysis impermissibly moved the focus
away from the actions of the defendant and towards a balancing of the burden on the defendant
100

Id. at 592.

101
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103
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and the benefit to the plaintiff of litigating in New Jersey.104 In a separate dissenting opinion,
Justice Rivera-Soto presciently urged the United States Supreme Court to review the case.105

a. The Court’s opinions

In a six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed.106 However, despite
a quarter century and the addition of eight new Justices since Asahi, the Court again produced no
majority opinion, and ended up with a plurality and dissent echoing many of the same themes
Justices O’Connor and Brennan argued over in Asahi so many years earlier.

In an opinion for a plurality of four Justices,107 Justice Kennedy staked out a strong
defense of Justice O’Connor’s position in Asahi.108 Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he stream of
commerce, like other metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utility.”109 Justice Kennedy’s
focus, like Justice O’Connor’s, was on the defendant’s specific intent. Thus, while a defendant

104

See id. at 602-05.

Id. at 605 (SOTO, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority ‘has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with’ settled federal constitutional principles, creates a new , unsubstantial, and meaningless standard for
the unbounded exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, and disturbs the careful balance that limits the exercise of judicial
power between and among the several states, this decision is ripe for review and correction by the Supreme Court of
the United States.”) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 10(b)) (citation omitted).
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But see Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551, 1563 (2012)
(“Whether Justice Kennedy's opinion is more stringent than Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi is unclear.
The fact that Justice Kennedy requires targeting the forum could lead to different results when the manufacturer
advertises in regional or national media. Justice O'Connor might find such advertising sufficient to show that the
manufacturer had ‘an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State,’ while Justice Kennedy might find
such advertising insufficiently targeted to give rise to jurisdiction.”).
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may subject itself to the jurisdiction of a state by introducing products into the stream of
commerce in an effort to “seek to serve” a given state’s market, it cannot be subject to
jurisdiction without some action that “manifest[s] an intention to submit to the power of the”
state at issue.110 “[A]s a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted
that its goods will reach a forum state.”111

The plurality explicitly rejected Justice Brennan’s approach. In the plurality’s view,
Justice Brennan’s approach impermissibly “discarded the central concept of sovereign authority
in favor of considerations of fairness and forseeability.”112 The plurality noted that although
personal jurisdiction doctrine protects individual liberty, it does so by preserving the individual’s
right to be subject only to lawful power, and the exercise of lawful power is dependent on
whether the sovereign has the authority to render a judgment in a given case.113 Therefore,
instead of fairness, the primary concern of the personal jurisdiction inquiry should be whether
the defendant has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by “follow[ing] a course of conduct
directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign.”114

Under this analysis, the result required in this case was obvious: J. McIntyre could not be
subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey courts. The plurality conceded that that the
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defendant had directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States as a whole.115 In the
plurality’s view however, this fact was irrelevant since the case involved a New Jersey state
court attempting to exercise jurisdiction, thus it was the defendant’s “purposeful contacts with
New Jersey, not with the United States, that alone [were] relevant.”116 Therefore, the fact that
the defendant had engaged a distributor to sell its products into the United States did not reveal
an intent to serve the New Jersey market in particular because the defendant had taken no action
to target the New Jersey market such as advertising in New Jersey or directing its distributor to
sell to specific New Jersey customers.117

In a dissent for three Justices,118 Justice Ginsburg sharply disagreed. In the dissent’s
view, the plurality’s approach “turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court . . . need only Pilate-like wash its
hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.”119 The dissent rejected the
plurality’s distinction between directing products to the United States as a whole and directing
products to a particular state.120 According to Justice Ginsburg, J. McIntyre’s arrangement with
its US distributor was “illustrative of marketing arrangements for sales in the United States
common in today’s commercial world. A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U.S. company
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to promote and distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any particular State, but anywhere
and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract purchasers.”121

While declining to specifically side with Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion over Justice
O’Connor’s,122 the dissent did mount a strong defense of notions of fairness and convenience
factoring into personal jurisdiction analysis:

The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other
legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place
to reason and fairness. Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode
of trading of which this case is an example, to require the
international seller to defend at the place its products cause injury?
Do not litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations
point in that direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can
it be considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New
Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United
States? Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey
fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting business internationally,
in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to Nottingham,
121

Id. at 2799.

See id. at 2803 (noting that in light of the Court’s agreement in Asahi that subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction
did not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, “the dueling opinions of Justice Brennan
and Justice O’Connor were hardly necessary.”); see also id. (finding Asahi distinguishable because it did not involve
a California plaintiff and Asahi was a component parts manufacturer who had “little control over the final
destination of its products”) (citations and quotations omitted).
122

England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using
McIntyre’s product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey?123

Although the dissent would still take into account the defendant’s intent, it would do so in
a much more general way than the plurality. In the dissent’s view, the purposeful availment
requirement “simply ‘ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous’' or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”124 It does not prevent the assertion of
jurisdiction where a manufacturer, like J. McIntyre, hires a distributor knowing it is likely that
distributor will sell its products in a particular forum.125

The dissent suggested a possible distinction between cases involving local plaintiffs
injured by the activity of a defendant seeking to exploit a multi-state or global market and cases
involving defendants whose economic activities are “largely home-based” who do not have
“designs to gain substantial revenue from distant markets.”126 In the latter cases, the dissent
found that the place where the product at issue causes injury seems to usually be the most
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See id. at 2801 (“How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell
products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap
metal market?”).
125
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appropriate place for a suit.127 From this framework, the dissent would have found that J.
McIntyre could be subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.128

In a concurrence joined by Justice Alito, Justice Breyer expressly declined to endorse
either the plurality or the dissent’s approach.129 He began by noting that the Supreme Court of
New Jersey’s opinion had adopted a “broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction”
based on its view of increasing globalization and recent changes in communication
technology.130 However, in Justice Breyer’s view, this case did not present any of the issues
raised by modern technology and commerce, thus making it an inappropriate vehicle to “mak[e]
broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”131

According to the concurrence, this case could be decided on the narrow grounds that the
defendant had sold only a single machine in New Jersey.132 Justice Breyer argued that in Asahi,
all the Members of the Court agreed that a single sale of a product in a state cannot form an
adequate basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant even where the
defendant places its goods in the stream of commerce, “fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale

127
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Id. at 2804. Justice Ginsburg also noted that she took “heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the
Court, for that opinion would take a giant step away from the “notions of fair play and substantial justice” underling
International Shoe[.]” Id.
128
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will take place.133 Such an isolated sale, in the concurrence’s view, was not enough to show the
“‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey required for the assertion of
jurisdiction under any formulation of the stream of commerce test.134

The concurrence argued that both the plurality and the dissent’s approach would present
unanticipated and potentially negative consequences if applied to situations raised by modern
commerce. Justice Breyer took the plurality to task for stating what he implicitly suggested was
an overly strict rule limiting jurisdiction to situations where the defendant specifically intends to
submit to the power of the sovereign at issue:

But what do those standards mean when a company targets the
world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if,
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the
products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then
receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets
its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be
viewed in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial
consequences but are totally absent in this case.135

Id. at 2792 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-12 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (requiring “something more” than simply
placing “a product into the stream of commerce,” even if defendant is “awar[e]” that the stream “may or will sweep
the product into the forum State”); id., at 117 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) (jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a
State is part of “the regular and anticipated flow” of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only an
“edd[y],” i.e., an isolated occurrence); id., at 122 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(indicating that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry
and emphasizing Asahi's “regular course of dealing”)).
133
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However, Justice Breyer went on to note that he did not agree with the “absolute approach
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court” that in his view focused only on whether the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution system might lead to its
products being sold in the forum at issue.136 Such an approach, the concurrence warned, could
have seemingly unfair consequences:

What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which
specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small
manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product
(cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).
I know too little about the range of these or in-between
possibilities to abandon in favor of the more absolute rule what has
previously been this Court's less absolute approach.

Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a
domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute
rule yet more uncertain. . . . [M]anufacturers come in many shapes
and sizes. It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small
Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a

136

Id.

Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international
distributors, to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually
every State in the United States, even those in respect to which the
foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single
(allegedly defective) good.137

Thus, Justice Breyer declined to pick between the plurality and the dissent, but implied
that he might be more willing to “work such a change in the law” in a case that implicated the
“relevant contemporary commercial circumstances.”138 Since in his view, this case did not
implicate those issues and could be easily resolved by the fact that the defendant only sold a
single product into New Jersey, Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment.

b. The confusion created by the opinions

The lack of a majority rationale in Nicastro, just like in Asahi so many years before, has
generated some controversy, and perhaps provided the framework for defense arguments against
jurisdiction in some stream of commerce cases, but has failed to provide courts and companies
with clear guidance. Although split decisions of the Court can occasionally still provide useful
guidance for lower courts and the public, that is particularly unlikely here because of the
extremely narrow grounds on which the “controlling” concurrence was based. Indeed, as one
court put it “[l]ike one of Dr. Rorschach's amorphous ink blots, Justice Breyer's opinion is
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susceptible to multiple interpretations.”139 Bearing this out, courts and commentators have been
unable to come to any agreement on the meaning of Nicastro, other than perhaps some consensus
that no significant guidance can be gleaned from it.

i. Public and Scholarly Reaction

The Court’s split decision in Nicastro, after its long silence on personal jurisdiction
issues, also predictably generated quite a bit of commentary. Some commentators, particularly
those sympathetic to the defense side of the civil litigation bar, were quick to declare an end to
the “foreseeability” analysis put forward by Justice Brennan in Asahi.140 Similarly, many
observers more sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ side of the equation were quick to sound the alarm
that Nicastro marked the beginning of an age where foreign corporations can easily insulate
themselves from suit in the United States.141 However, most initial reaction and analysis
focused on the continuing uncertainty the decision maintained from Asahi.142
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See, e.g., Kim M. Watterson & Paige H. Forster, Where Can You Sue?- International Arena- Personal
Jurisdiction- Due Process, Kimbusinesslaw.com, Jun. 29, 2011, http://kimbusinesslaw.com/2011/07/10/where-canyou-sue-international-arena-personal-jurisdiction-due-process/ (“McIntyre . . . provide[s] solid footing on which a
defendant can fight jurisdiction in any state where it has not “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of
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addition to the plurality] against the dissent’s – and the Brennan Asahi concurrence’s – reliance on pure
foreseeability as sufficient for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction. That issue seems dead.”).
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in the U.S. court system”); Maxwell Kennerly, Supreme Court Term In Review For Consumers, Employees and
Injured Persons, Litigation and Trial, http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/07/articles/attorney/personal-injury1/supreme-court-term-in-review-for-consumers-employees-and-injured-persons/ (Jul. 5, 2011) (“[Nicastro] makes it

Later scholarly reaction has been similarly varied. Law review pieces have interpreted
Nicastro to be everything from the harbinger of a new era of virtual immunity from suit for
foreign defendants in the United States143 to suggesting that the combination of the views of the
dissent and the concurrence signals the court’s willingness “to once again adjust its personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence to more effectively contend with the modern economy.”144 Still, most
reaction (like this article) laments the lack of guidance provided by Nicastro’s split decision after
so many years of silence from the Court.145

ii. The Marks Test

harder [to] hold foreign companies accountable for dangerous products, since the foreign companies typically
conduct their activities through distributors”).
See, e.g., Buehler, supra note 87, at 120 (after Nicastro, “the stream of commerce doctrine will be very much in
flux in the years ahead”); Howard Wasserman, Clarifying personal jurisdiction . . . or not, PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personal-jurisdiction-or-not.html (Jun. 28, 2011)
(“As we all remember from 1L, the Asahi Court divided 4-4-1[.] . . . Twenty-five years later, still no resolution. Four
justices, lead by Justice Kennedy, emphatically rejected the Brennan view[.] . . . But we still do not have a majority
view on the question. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Alito, to again punt the
question.”); Kendall Gray, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro: Declarifying Asahi, The Appellate Record,
http://www.appellaterecord.com/2011/06/articles/new-opinions/j-mcintyre-machinery-v-nicastro-declarifying-asahi/
(Jun. 28, 2011) (“Nicastro gave the Court a chance to pick [between the competing approaches in Asahi]. But alas,
five cats could not be herded into a single corral.” ; “For want of a fifth vote, we are about 14,000 words the richer
after today's three opinions, but none the wiser.)
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Nicastro, 64 ALA. L. REV. 417, 418-20 (2012).
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contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a forum's general personal jurisdiction.”); Simpson-Wood, supra
note 25, at 124 n.74.

Under the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Marks v. United States,146 the way to divine
a binding rule from a decision with no majority opinion such as Nicastro is to look for the
“position taken by those Members [of the Court] who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds[.]”147 However, the Court has, on at least two occasions, questioned the
workability of this rule, noting that it is “is more easily stated than applied” and declining to
“pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered it.”148

Even if the Marks test remains viable, it is not particularly helpful in this case. It does
seem clear that the Members of the Court who “concurred in the judgmen[t]” on the narrowest
ground appear to be Justices Breyer and Alito. However, their concurrence explicitly disclaims
the creation of any “new” personal jurisdiction rules, noting that “resolving this case requires no
more than adhering to our precedents” which, in the concurrence’s view, have never allowed “a
single isolated sale” in a forum to form the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.149
Therefore, at most, Nicastro stands for the proposition that a single sale from a national
distributor to a particular state does not subject the manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in that
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state, but this proposition is of limited value to manufacturers seeking to plan for or avoid
liability in particular jurisdictions.150

A manufacturer cannot be expected to tell its distributor to only make (at most) a single
sale of a particular product in a jurisdiction. In fact, such an instruction might even constitute the
type of particularized targeting of a sovereign required by the plurality, ensnaring the
manufacturer in the jurisdiction they were attempting to avoid. Also, while this “rule of one”
makes some sense in the context of the $ 24,900 machine at issue in Nicastro, it starts to loose
coherence when applied to other types of goods.151 A company selling prescription drugs to a
national distributor cannot practically limit itself to “one sale” in any jurisdiction even if it does
not target any particular jurisdiction, while a company selling private jets may adhere to this
limit and be subject to personal jurisdiction anyway because of the large amount of purposeful
contacts that would probably be required to make such a sale. Thus, the Marks test is unlikely to
provide much relief from Nicastro’s opacity.

iii. Court Reaction

See Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 4443626, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sep. 23, 2011) (“As Justice Breyer
declined to choose between the Asahi plurality opinions, McIntyre is rather limited in its applicability. It does not
provide the Court with grounds to depart from the Fifth Circuit precedents establishing Justice Brennan's Asahi
opinion as the controlling analysis. At best, it is applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that it
does.”)
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See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2803 n.15 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (“A $24,900 shearing machine . . . is unlikely to
sell in bulk worldwide, much less in any given state . . . had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of
flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to
suit in that State.”) (citations omitted).
151

Not surprisingly, courts have not found Nicastro particularly helpful in settling
jurisdictional disputes over the stream of commerce doctrine. Despite the hopes of critics of a
broad stream of commerce test and the fears of a broad test’s supporters, courts have mostly
found Justice Breyer’s opinion controlling—and mostly found that it does not have much to say.
Two circuit courts, that have taken an in depth look at Nicastro have reached the conclusion that,
given the narrowness of Justice Breyer’s opinion, the end result of Nicastro is that “the law
remains the same” as it was before, “including the conflicting articulations of [the stream of
commerce] theory in Asahi[.]”152 Similarly, state courts have largely declined to alter their preexisting jurisdictional framework based on Nicastro, even when those frameworks would seem
to conflict with the plurality’s approach.153

For example, the Fifth Circuit—which had previously adopted a test similar to Justice
Brennan’s Asahi approach for stream of commerce cases—dealt with the impact of Nicastro very
directly in a case bearing striking similarities to Nicastro, Ainsworth v. Moffett Engineering.154
In that case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a products liability claim against an Irish company that
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LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Russell v. SNFA, No. 113909, 2013 Ill. LEXIS 557, at *36-40 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2013) (“McIntyre has not
definitively clarified the proper application of the stream of commerce theory”); Sumatra Tobacco, 2013 WL
1248285, at *27 (“Most courts that have applied the Marks rule to J. McIntyre Machinery have determined that
Justice Breyer's opinion was the judgment that concurred "on the narrowest grounds.” . . . Nevertheless, while
Justice Breyer's opinion may be controlling, it fails to resolve the United States Supreme Court's impasse over the
stream of commerce theory and, therefore, leaves existing law undisturbed”) (collecting cases); Willemsen v.
Invacare Corp., 282 P. 3d 867, 875 (Or. 2012) (“If [the Nicastro plurality] opinion were controlling, it might be
difficult for plaintiff to show that, on this record, CTE's contacts with Oregon were sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over it. As explained above, however, the rule that the Court announced in Marks for construing
splintered decisions leads us to conclude that the rationale expressed in Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the
judgment controls our resolution of this case.”).
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hired an Ohio based distributor to distribute its forklifts.155 The plaintiff’s husband was killed by
an allegedly defective forklift while working at his job in Mississippi.156 The plaintiff sued both
the distributor and the manufacturer in federal court in Mississippi, and the district court denied
the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.157 Like the manufacturer
in Nicastro, the manufacturer in Ainsworth did not specifically direct any of its products to the
state of Mississippi but rather hired its distributor to distribute its products in the United States
generally.158 The manufacturer did nothing to limit the scope of the distributor’s sales of its
products by state.159

The Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that its stream of commerce test160 is “in
tension with the plurality opinion” in Nicastro, but declined to change that test in light of
Nicastro.161 Instead, the court found that the plurality was “not binding precedent” and applied
the Marks test to determine that Justice Breyer’s opinion was the controlling opinion in
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Id.
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Id.

158

Id. at *10-11.

159

Id.

That test allows the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where a court “finds that the
defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it would be purchased by or
used by consumers in the forum state.” Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424, at *5 (quotations and citations
omitted). “Under that test, ‘mere foreseeability or awareness [is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal
jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce,’ but
‘[t]he defendant's contacts must be more than 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated, or of the unilateral activity of
another party or third person.’” Id. (citations omitted).
160

161

Id. at *9-8.

Nicastro.162 It found, echoing the Federal Circuit’s similar conclusion, that Justice Breyer’s
concurrence did not require the abandonment of the Brennan-like approach the Fifth Circuit had
previously adopted.163 The court found that all Justice Breyer’s opinion stood for was that a
“single isolated sale” could not support jurisdiction.164 In this case, since the manufacturer had
sold 203 forklifts worth nearly four million dollars in Mississippi, the court found the exercise of
jurisdictional compatible with Justice Breyer’s opinion and affirmed the district court. 165

The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Russell v. SNFA.166 Although
the court acknowledged the “isolated sale” rule from the Nicastro concurrence, it rejected the
defendant’s argument that Justice Breyer also endorsed Justice O’Connor’s Asahi approach.167
Accordingly, as it had done in the past, the court declined to adopt either the broad or narrow
theory of the stream of commerce doctrine articulated in the dueling opinions in Asahi and
Nicastro.168

Other courts have purported to glean slightly more from Nicastro. In Bombardier v. Dow
Chemical, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the plurality and concurrence agreed
162

Id. at *7-8.
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Id. at *8-11 (citing AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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Ainsworth, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9424 at *8-11.
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Id. at *10-11
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No. 113909, 2013 Ill. LEXIS 557, at *36-40 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2013).

Id. (“Justice Breyer quite clearly disagreed with the plurality’s decision to rely on ‘strict rules’ to limit
jurisdiction to only situations when the defendant intended to submit to a state’s sovereign power.”).
167

168

Id. at *40. The court concluded in that particular case that it need not decide between the competing approaches
because the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois under either one because the defendant
had taken specific steps to target Illinois as a market for its products.

that “mere foreseeability, at least where products are not sold in a state as part of the regular and
anticipated flow of commerce into that state, is not enough to establish minimum contacts with
the forum state.”169 However, the court found that beyond this conclusion (which, arguably was
evident before Nicastro anyway170), the opinions in Nicastro did “not significantly add to the
state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.”171 Other courts have similarly concluded that a test
based on foreseeability alone is ruled out by Nicastro.172

There are a few outlier courts who have gone even further. For example, in Smith v.
Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.,173 the court determined that the “common denominator of the
Court's reasoning and a position approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment is
the ‘stream of commerce plus’ rubric enunciated in an opinion by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.”174
The court pointed to Justice Breyer’s approving citation of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion in
his analysis as proof that “six Justices agree[d] [that] at a minimum, the limitations of Justice

169

Bombardier v. Dow Chem. Canada, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 399, at *9 (2013).

Indeed, Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion itself endorses the “regular flow” concept. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117
(“The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”) (BRENNAN, J. concurring).
170

171

Id.

See, e.g., Windsor v. Spinner Industry Co., Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011) (“McIntyre clearly
rejects foreseeability as the standard for personal jurisdiction.”). At least one court also found that Nicastro stood
for the proposition that targeting a national market was insufficient to give rise to specific jurisdiction in any one
state. See Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 513 (D.N.J. 2011) (“[W]hether or not the
plurality's strict rule is the de facto standard for stream of commerce cases going forward, there is no doubt that
Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the
forum States.”).
172

173

840 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D.S.C. 2012).

174

Id. at 930 (some internal quotations omitted).

O'Connor's test should be applied.”175 Similarly, in Northern Ins. Co. of New York v.
Construction Navale Bordeaux,176 the court cited Justice Breyer’s opinion to justify applying
Justice O’Connor’s Asahi test to a motion to dismiss by a foreign defendant.177

However, cases applying this interpretation are not widespread and with good reason.178
It is hard to justify reading Justice Breyer’s opinion as changing the status quo when he explicitly
disclaimed doing so in his own opinion. He stated flatly that Nicastro presented “an unsuitable
vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules” and that
resolving the case simply required “adher[ing] strictly to [the Court’s] precedents.”179 Although
Justice Breyer does cite Justice O’Connor’s “something more” rule from Asahi, in that very same
string citation, he also cites Justice Brennan’s distinction between the regular and anticipated
flow of commerce and the occasional “eddy.”180 Justice Breyer was merely using these citations
to support his argument that a “single isolated sale” cannot give rise to jurisdiction under any of
the tests articulated by Asahi, not to endorse one test over another. 181
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Id. at 931.
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No. 11-60462-CV, 2011 WL 2682950 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2011).
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Id. at *5.

See Buehler, supra note 87, at 120 (“[I]t would be a mistake for lower courts and scholars to overreact to the
Nicastro Court’s limited holding. Justice Breyer did not reject the plurality’s rule or the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s approach out of hand . . . . For now, the law remains unsettled.”).
178

179

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (BREYER, J. concurring).

Id. at 2792. He also cited Justice Stevens’ opinion for the proposition that the “the volume, the value, and the
hazardous character" of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry[.]” Id.
180

This is a somewhat dubious argument with respect to Justice Brennan’s approach. Although Justice Brennan
does distinguish between the usual flow and the eddies, that distinction had much more to do with whether the
movement of the defendant’s products could have been anticipated by the defendant, rather than what the volume of
those products happened to be. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (“The stream of commerce
refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture
181

Thus, except perhaps in situations involving a single sale, Nicastro leaves courts without
guidance about the proper application of the stream of commerce doctrine, particularly in the
context of foreign manufacturers. While the Nicastro plurality provides a lot of ammunition for
defense arguments against assertions of personal jurisdiction, Nicastro does not lay out a clear
rule that will be of much help to foreign manufacturers in structuring their conduct to avoid (or
account for) potential liability in particular jurisdictions. Instead, the decision in Nicastro leaves
foreign manufacturers, distributors and consumers (not to mention litigation attorneys) to “feel
their way on a case-by-case basis” without definitive guidance from the Court.182

IV.

Predictability In Personal Jurisdiction Is Critical

This state of affairs is unacceptable, both from an economic and legal standpoint.
International manufacturers seeking entry into the American market and the domestic
distributors who sell their products have no way to apportion the risk of liability between
themselves, or to plan to avoid liability in certain jurisdictions altogether. This may make
foreign manufacturers likely to raise prices to account for this uncertainty, or hesitate to enter the
American market altogether.183

to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed
in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”) (emphasis added). It is hard to
argue that J. McIntyre could not have anticipated that one of its machines could end up in New Jersey. Nicastro,
131 S.Ct. at 2801 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
182
183

See Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (ROBERTS, C.J., concurring in the judgment).

See Brief of the Organization for International Investment and Association of International Automobile
Manufacturers Inc. as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 10, Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.,
564 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (noting that several studies have concluded that unpredictability
in the US legal market is one of the top concerns of businesses considering entering the American market).

At the same time, from a doctrinal perspective, this situation creates exactly the situation
that Justices with nearly all perspectives on personal jurisdiction jurisprudence have routinely
said they were seeking to avoid: placing potential defendants in a situation where they are unsure
whether they will be subject to liability. Placing defendants in this situation does not comport
with the traditional notions of fairness that personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause is
supposed to be based upon. In other words, the uncertainty created by the Court’s inability to
reach a consensus on this issue may itself be creating violations of defendants’ due process
rights.

a. International companies seeking entry to the US market and their domestic
distributors cannot apportion the risk of liability between themselves or
incorporate the costs of risk into their products without a clearer rule.

Lack of clarity about personal jurisdiction rules creates a lack of clarity about the risk of
liability that a manufacturer or distributor will be subject to because of variations in the product
liability law and related procedure of different forums. Although it is true in theory that the
choice of the forum for a lawsuit does not necessarily require the application of that forum’s law,
as Professor Daniel Klerman demonstrated in a recent article, in practice, the choice of forum has
a substantial effect on the choice of law and ultimately the outcome of product liability suits. 184
Most obviously, different jurisdictions have different choice of law rules, so the choice of forum

184

See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566.

in that sense literally dictates the choice of law.185 Moreover, “most choice-of-law
methodologies are relatively malleable, and many commentators have noted that judges
frequently conclude that choice-of-law principles require application of the forum state’s
substantive law.”186 Even if a forum does choose to apply another state’s law, it will still apply
its own procedural rules,187 which can have a substantial impact on liability and the extent of
damages.188 Finally, judicial selection methods and the composition of juries vary from forum
to forum, which can also have a substantial impact on the outcome of a case.189 Thus, the lack of
clear jurisdictional rules leaves companies selling across state and international boundaries
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See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566.
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Id. at 1566 & n.50.
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See, e.g., GEORGE W. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (3d ed. 1963).
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Id. at 1566. For example, some states limit the availability of punitive damages, and one state and many foreign
jurisdictions disallow them altogether. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1604(3) (limiting punitive damages awards to
$250,000 dollars or three times the compensatory damages award); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-51-3-4 (limiting punitive
damages awards to $50,000 or three times the compensatory damages award); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. (2010)
(limiting punitive damages awards to $350,000 regardless of the compensatory damages award); Dailey v. N. Coast
Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 (Wash. 1996) (noting that punitive damages are not available under Washington
law); Jessica J. Berch, The Need for Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Awards by the European Union, 19
MINN. J. OF INT’L LAW 55, 78 (noting that no European Union countries other than the United Kingdom allow the
award of punitive damages). Additionally, states have widely divergent standards standards for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony—an issue that often has a determinative impact on product liability litigation.
Compare McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that differences in the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of evidence required the adoption of a heightened standard for
the admissibility of expert testimony; “This distinction indicates that the probative force of the testimony must be
stronger before it is admitted in Tennessee.”) (quotations and citations omitted) with State v. Swope, 762 N.W.2d
725, 730-32 (Wis. App. 2008) (Applying a “relevancy test” that is less strict than Daubert to the admissibility of
expert testimony); see, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health.
S59, S59 (2005) (noting that the outcome of a Daubert motion can be dispositive in many civil cases).
Klerman, supra note 108, at 1566. Indeed, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Nicastro recognizes that there are wide
disparities in how states apply their products liability laws in practice. See Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2794 (BREYER, J.
concurring) (noting that in one study the percentage of plaintiff winners in tort trials among 46 populous counties,
ranged from 17.9% (in Worcester, Mass.) to 69.1% (in Milwaukee, Wis.)) (citing Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, p. 11).
189

unable to determine the degree of liability they may be opening themselves up to with their
conduct.

This uncertainty is economically troublesome for at least three reasons. First,
international manufactures are unable to apportion the risk of liability appropriately between
themselves and domestic distributors without knowing the types of liability risks to which they
are being subject. Second, companies may not appropriately account for the risk of liability in
setting their prices, undermining the “signaling” affect product liability rules are supposed to
create for consumers. Third, companies may not be able to appropriately account for the
differing risks of liability created by different state tort law regimes.

i. Personal Jurisdiction Uncertainty Impedes Efficient Transactions Between
Distributors and Manufacturers

When an international company wants to distribute its products in the United States, it is
often easiest for that company to work through a domestic distributor.190 Domestic distribution
of foreign products is a multi-billion dollar business in the United States. 191 Unclear personal
jurisdiction rules can present a problem for distributors and manufactures in this system because
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See Amit K. Ghosh, W. Benoy Joseph, John T. Gardner, and Sharon V. Thach, Understanding industrial
distributors' expectations of benefits from relationships with suppliers, 19 J. BUS. & INDUS. MARKETING 433, 434-35
(noting that “The status of distributors has risen almost continuously over the past few decades as they increase their
domination over the sales channel. The reduction of trade barriers and the resultant increase in potential suppliers
has further enhanced the nature of vertical competition, thereby increasing the importance of distributors.”)
(citations omitted).
191

See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Goods Trade:
Imports & Exports by Related-Parties 2012, at 4 (May 2, 2013), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/PressRelease/2012pr/aip/related_party/rp12.pdf (noting that there were over 1 trillion dollars worth of goods imported
into the United States in 2012 by non-related parties, nearly 50% of the total imports for that year).

of the existence of strict liability combined with joint and several liability in products liability
cases.

Because of strict product liability rules, manufacturers and their distributors can both be
on the hook for a plaintiff’s injuries in a product liability case.192 In a case where the
manufacturer and the distributor are both subject to personal jurisdiction, the burden of
defending such a claim (and of paying any settlement or judgment) will fall on both the
manufacturer and the distributor. Conversely, in a case where the manufacturer cannot be
subject to personal jurisdiction (like in Nicastro itself), the distributor is left holding the bag and
must take the entire burden of defending the claim (and of potential liability) onto its own
shoulders.

In a world where the Nicastro dissent’s “expectations” based test was applied, the former
situation would occur much more often.193 In a world where the Nicastro plurality’s test was
applied, the latter situation would be more common.194 If the “expectations” test were the law,
manufacturers and distributors would likely buy an amount of liability insurance coverage
consummate with the risks of defending these claims (but doing not doing so alone). If the
plurality’s test were the law, distributors would either have to purchase more liability insurance
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See, e.g., JAMES A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.64 (1977).
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Indeed, it would seem that it would almost always work that way assuming that the manufacturer had some
understanding of the territory in which the distributor was selling its products.
194

Although it would not necessarily always be that way since a manufacturer could take specific actions that would
subject it to jurisdiction in a given forum, such as specifically directing a distributor to target a specific state, or
advertising in that state independently of the distributor.

(and pass these costs onto consumers and/or demand lower prices from manufacturers) or seek
broad indemnification clauses in purchase contracts with foreign manufacturers.

Unfortunately, distributors and manufacturers do not live in either of these worlds.
Instead, they must continue these transactions in an environment where the manufacturer’s level
of exposure to personal jurisdiction (and by extension, liability), is unclear. Because of this,
negotiations between manufacturers and distributors will be impeded, and deals will be made
that may ultimately turn out to have been inefficient. Distributors may end up “holding the bag”
when they did not (and could not) anticipate doing so. Or, manufacturers may have to pay
“twice” for the risk of liability, once by having to sell to a distributor at lower prices to account
for the distributor’s risk of being subject to liability alone and again if it turns out that the
manufacturer actually is subject to suit after all.

ii. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals Reflecting
Product Safety

Another problem with this uncertainty is that it undermines one of the core purposes of
tort liability in general, and strict product liability in particular, building the “riskiness” of a
product into its price as a “signal” to consumers.195 Most people lack information about the
safety of consumer products. However, product liability suits force manufacturers to either
change their products to make them safer or raise prices of their products to reflect the risk of
liability that those products carry. When manufactures do that, consumers can make optimal
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See Buehler, supra note 87, at 123.

purchasing decisions even without knowing technical information about product safety, because
the price they pay will reflect the full “cost” of the product, including its risk of causing harm.196

Because uncertain jurisdictional rules make it difficult for distributors and manufacturers
to properly apportion the risk of liability between themselves, the ultimate result will likely be
that products’ end prices to consumers may be increased to account for this uncertainty. This
price increase will not be a “signal” of anything other than the difficulty of doing business in an
uncertain legal environment, which may drown out any price signaling that would differentiate
products based on the actual level of risk associated with them.

iii. Unclear Personal Jurisdiction Rules Weaken Pricing Signals Reflecting
Variations in State Law

The current regime (or lack thereof) also undermines another set of pricing “signals”:
those associated with different states’ product liability rules. Because different states have
different substantive and procedural rules governing liability, some states will expose
manufacturers to more exacting scrutiny of their products by the court system. This increased
scrutiny has two primary effects in these jurisdictions: increased costs for manufactures and
increased safety of consumer products. When manufacturers raise their prices (or abandon a
jurisdiction altogether) in response to such rules, it gives consumers a “signal” that they are
paying for the higher safety level imposed by their state’s law. By reading these signals,
consumers can balance the level of consumer protection they desire with the pricing and
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Id.

availability of products they want by choosing what jurisdictions to purchase products in (and/or
where to live).197

Just like the direct signaling of product safety, signals about state law are only effective if
manufacturers and consumers are able to predict with some reliability which laws (and which
courts) will govern each purchase. For the reasons discussed above in part IV(a), being subject
to personal jurisdiction in a state at least results in the application of that state’s procedural rules
and often results in being subject to the substantive law of that state as well. Because of the
uncertainty that currently exists in this area, manufacturers often will be unable to build the
“price” of different states’ tort laws into their products because they will not know whether they
can be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state. Thus, as long as the “stream of commerce”
doctrine remains undefined, consumers not get the benefit of the pricing signals reflecting state
law differences. Instead, consumers may end up “paying for” consumer protections they are not
getting if a manufacturer erroneously believes it will be subject to jurisdiction in a particular
state and raises prices on that basis. Conversely, manufacturers may be unexpectedly subject to
liability that they were unable to price into their products.

197

Just like consumers without adequate information about product safety can benefit from price-signaling, so too
can consumers without adequate information about applicable legal rules benefit from price signaling. Consumers
lacking information about comparative tort law regimes are likely to be even more common than those with little
knowledge of relative product safety. See Klerman, supra note 108, at 1572-74 (noting that it would be “absurd” to
suggest that “consumers . . . have detailed knowledge of the laws and procedures of the relevant states so that they
could figure out how each state's laws and procedures impact the amount they would be willing to pay for [a]
product and so that they could make informed choices between competing products. . . . Very few tort professors
could tell you whether Ohio or Colorado has more favorable product liability law, much less put a dollar amount on
the difference. In addition, it is simply not worth anyone's time to figure out the relevant laws and their impacts. The
probability of an actionable accident for any mass-produced product is negligible, so it would be irrational for any
consumer to spend the time to read a forum-selection clause much less research the relevant state's laws or try to
calculate how those laws affect their valuation of the product.”).

Thus, bringing clarity to the stream of commerce theory would provide positive
economic benefits by removing the cloud of uncertainty hanging over consumers, distributors,
and manufacturers.

b. Due Process Requires A Clear Rule

Economic concerns aside, the lack of a clear rule on the stream of commerce test creates
a level of uncertainty that is itself a violation of the due process principles that have formed the
underpinning of modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The Court has emphasized that
predictability for the defendant is an important part of what makes the assertion of personal
jurisdiction fair. Indeed, this animating principle underlies both the Nicastro plurality and
dissent’s approach to the stream of commerce test. However, by declining to choose between
these competing approaches, the Court has undermined this principle by creating the exact
unpredictability that an overwhelming majority of the current Court (and its Members since
International Shoe) has agreed is unacceptable under the Due Process Clause.

Ever since the introduction of the minimum contacts test in International Shoe, the Court
has emphasized that whether a defendant subjects itself to personal jurisdiction should be, on
some level, entirely within the defendant’s control.198 Even prior to the “International Shoe era”
of personal jurisdiction, the doctrine has always been aimed at allowing the defendant to make a
choice to submit him or herself (or itself) to personal jurisdiction. Under the prior regime, a
defendant could do that simply by choosing whether or not to be physically present in the
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See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.

forum.199 “Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam [was]
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding on him.”200 This system was justified in part because the defendant “voluntarily entered
[the forum and] has no one but himself to blame” for being subject to suit there.201

The modern stream of commerce debate focuses on the type of control that a defendant
exercises (i.e., taking actions that foreseeably could lead to a product being sold in a forum vs.
taking actions that are directly targeted to a forum), but all sides agree that the defendant’s
choices should ultimately underlie the personal jurisdiction inquiry. The debate is really just
over what type of choices are relevant.

The Court recognized as much in two of its seminal personal jurisdiction opinions, World
Wide Volkswagen and Burger King. In World Wide Volkswagen, the Court emphasized that
subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction in Oklahoma would not comport with due process
because one of the primary purposes of the Due Process Clause, “ensuring the orderly
administration of the laws,” would be undermined by creating a system where defendants were
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See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610-11 (opinion of SCALIA, J.) (noting the historical practice of states exercising
jurisdiction over any defendant who is physically present in the state).
200

201

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 625 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); id. at 635-36 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment)
(however murky the jurisprudential origins of transient jurisdiction, the fact that American courts have announced
the rule for perhaps a century (first in dicta, more recently in holdings) provides a defendant voluntarily present in a
particular State today "clear notice that [he] is subject to suit."). In keeping with this justification, states traditionally
exempted from valid service defendants who were coerced into entering the state. See id. at 613 (opinion of SCALIA,
J.).

unable to “structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to whether that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”202

Two of the three dissenters also agreed with the majority on the importance of allowing
the defendant to structure its primary conduct to control its amenability to suit in a particular
forum.203 Although they would have held that the act of selling a mobile product and being part
of a national chain of dealerships was sufficient conduct to subject the defendant to jurisdiction
in Oklahoma, they still understood due process as requiring that the defendant be put on notice
that their activities could cause them to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.204

In Burger King, a case that approved the exercise of jurisdiction by Florida courts over a
Michigan franchisee of a Florida corporation, the Court made even clearer the importance of
predictability in the personal jurisdiction inquiry. The Court began its analysis by noting that the
due process clause requires that potential defendants “have ‘fair warning that a particular activity
may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”205 In this case, the Court held that
the franchisee could be subject to jurisdiction in Florida because he had “deliberately reached
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World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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See id. at 316 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The exception was Justice Brennan who argued for a rule based on the
contacts between both parties and the forum, where the defendant’s contacts with the forum would not necessarily
be decisive. See id. at 309-12 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). However, by the time he wrote the opinion of the Court in
Burger King, Justice Brennan apparently came to agree that a defendant should be able to choose, through its
actions, which forums it will be subject to jurisdiction in. See 471 U.S. at 475-76.
World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 316 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (“a local automobile dealer who makes
himself part of a nationwide network of dealerships can fairly expect that the cars they sell may cause injury in
distant States and that they may be called on to defend a resulting lawsuit there”).
204
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Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring))
(alteration in original).

out” to the Florida corporation to enter into the franchise agreement, making it reasonably
foreseeable that he would be subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida if a dispute arose out of
that agreement.206

Thus, concerns about predictability have long been important to the personal jurisdiction
inquiry. Yet, the concurrence’s indecision in Nicastro has left manufacturers in a situation
where, even with the help of sophisticated lawyers, they cannot structure their primary conduct
to avoid or accept liability in particular forums. Instead they are relegated to guessing whether
courts in a particular jurisdiction will apply the plurality’s approach, the dissent’s approach, or
some combination of the two. This state of affairs neither “ensur[s] the orderly administration of
the laws,” nor gives defendants “fair warning that [their] activit[ies] may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”207

Either The Plurality Of The Dissent’s Approach Can Be Readily Applied To The

V.

“Modern” Issues That Troubled the Concurrence

The concurrence’s primary justification208 for declining to settle the stream of commerce
issue was that making such a choice was inappropriate in Nicastro because the case did not
206

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80, 482, 487.
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See also S. Wilson Quick, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of
Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 547, 550 (2012) (“The lack of predictability resulting from the
state of jurisdictional analysis is inefficient and diametrically opposed to due process.”).
208

The concurrence also mentioned that it might be more appropriate to finally settle the issue in a case where the
Solicitor General participated. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). This objection is puzzling. The
fate of the stream of commerce doctrine will primarily impact the ability of state courts to adjudicate disputes arising
under state law, not federal courts. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(k) (allowing the assertion of personal jurisdiction in
lawsuits arising under federal law where “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general

“implicate modern concerns.” These modern concerns include situations where a company
“targets the world by selling products from its Web site” or “consigns products through an
intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfils the orders” or “market[s] its
products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum.”209 In the
concurrence’s view, without a case that presented such concerns, it would be inappropriate to
“work such a change in the law the way either the plurality or the New Jersey Supreme Court
suggest[ed].”210

On the surface, this seems like a reasonable and pragmatic approach, but a closer
examination reveals that this hesitation is unjustified. As the plurality points out, common law
processes always work by establishing broad principles which are then adapted to specific
situations, such as the ones the concurrence is concerned with:

The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to
judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice
O'Connor’s opinion in Asahi, does not by itself resolve many
difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases.
The defendant's conduct and the economic realities of the market
jurisdiction”); Brief of Arkansas, Arizona, Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, & West Virginia as
Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents at 1, Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., 564 U.S. __, 131
S.Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343) (noting the states “interest in the articulation of a clear rule governing personal
jurisdiction in the products liability context to provide guidance to our courts and our citizens.”). Moreover, nothing
about Nicastro prevented the Court from calling for the Solicitor General’s views in that case.
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the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial
exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of
that principle.211

More importantly, there are specific reasons to expect that choosing between the competing
approaches to the stream of commerce theory would not present a problem with respect to the
“modern concerns” identified by the concurrence. Lower courts have already successfully
applied both versions of the stream of commerce test to the e-commerce situations that give the
concurrence pause. The outcomes of these cases suggest that the plurality and dissent’s
approaches actually would not differ as much in their application to e-commerce issues as they
would in their application to more “traditional” cases like Nicastro. Although one can
imagine—as the concurrence does—cases involving the Internet where the stream of commerce
rule would be decisive, these situations do not call for a fundamentally different analysis than the
one called for in Nicastro.

a. The Application of the Stream-of Commerce Test Is Usually Distinct From Issues
Presented By The Internet

Courts adopting both approaches to the stream of commerce test appear to approach
internet commerce the same way: by making a distinction between websites that are “passive”
and websites that are “interactive.”212 Websites simply presenting information about a business
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See Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). This test appears to
have originated from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). See David

that do not provide any option for communication or commerce between the user and the
business are usually not considered “contacts” with any particular forum.213 Conversely,
websites allowing the user to directly communicate with the company, such as by purchasing
products, are considered significant “contacts” for purposes of the personal jurisdiction
inquiry.214 The stream of commerce test is usually, at most, ancillary to these cases, which focus
on objective characteristics of the websites at issue, rather than on the defendant’s awareness or
intention.

For example, in Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh
Circuit, which applies Justice Brennan’s Asahi approach,215 affirmed a district court’s finding
that Indiana lacked personal jurisdiction over a Danish manufacturer of a jack that allegedly
caused the plaintiff’s death at his workplace.216 The defendant sold its products into the United
States through a distributor in Florida, although the record did not reflect any sales into Indiana

Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Back to the Future: Revisiting Zippo in Light of “Modern Concerns”, 29 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231, 236-40 (2011).
See, e.g., id. at 550 (“[A] defendant's maintenance of a passive website does not support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over that defendant in a particular forum just because the website can be accessed there.”) (collecting
cases); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting personal
jurisdiction over a corporation whose internet contacts with the forum were “at most, passive”).
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See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centrucut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 329-31 (D.S.C. 1999) (describing the “sliding
scale” of interactivity between websites “doing nothing more than advertising [a] product on the internet [and]
‘interactive’ websites in which individuals enter into contracts with [companies] via the internet[.]”).
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See Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F. 2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Sullivan v. Author Solutions, Inc.,
No. 07-C-1137, 2008 WL 2937786, at *4 n.9 (E.D. Wis. Jul. 23, 2008) (finding the assertion of personal jurisdiction
appropriate where “Here, defendant placed its books into the stream of commerce by delegating its printing and
sales functions to its printers and distributors. Defendant expected that the books printed and distributed by these
entities would be distributed in all of the states they serviced.”).
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or the volume of total sales through the distributor.217 The defendant also maintained a website,
in English, that was accessible throughout the United States.218 The website contained
information about the defendant’s products and contact information, but did not allow consumers
to place orders directly through the website.219

The plaintiff argued that the website was sufficient to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in Indiana since it was essentially soliciting business from anywhere, including
Indiana, by being accessible from anywhere (and being available in English).220 The court
rejected that argument as “sweep[ing] too broadly” since “it is unusual to find a company that
does not maintain at least a passive website [so] [p]remising personal jurisdiction on the
maintenance of website, without requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant
and consumers . . ., would create almost universal personal jurisdiction[.]”221 The court found
that since the defendant’s website allowed for no interaction at all and instead just made
information available, it could not be a sufficient contact to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in Indiana.222
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Separately, the court rejected the argument that an undetermined number of sales to the
Florida distributor could support personal jurisdiction in Indiana because of a lack of evidence
presented by the plaintiff regarding how the jack at issue in the case got to Indiana, and what the
volume of sales was from the distributor to Indiana.223

Similarly, in Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770 (D.S.C. 1999), a district court
in a jurisdiction that has adopted Justice O’Connor’s Asahi approach,224 rejected the assertion of
personal jurisdiction by South Carolina against a German manufacturer of paper shredders.225
The plaintiff in that case was making a product liability claim against the manufacturer because
of injuries she sustained from a paper shredder in her father’s office.226 The manufacturer sold
its products to an American distributor,227 who then sold the shredders to a third company, which
sold the shredder at issue to the plaintiff’s father’s employer.228 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant was aware that its shredders could end up in South Carolina, and that the ‘additional
conduct’ requirement of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi test was satisfied by the defendant
maintaining a website accessible to South Carolina consumers, which the plaintiff attempted to
equate with advertising in South Carolina.229
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Although the case does not explicitly mention where the distributor was based, it is apparent from the court’s
analysis that the distributor must have been based in a state other than South Carolina.
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The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the website at issue was a “passive” website
which only presented information about the defendant’s products and contact information.230
The court noted that there was no evidence that the defendant had done anything to encourage
South Carolina consumers to visit the website or that a substantial number of them had done
so.231 Thus, the court concluded that there was no evidence “that this web site was directed at
South Carolina any more than any other place in the world [and] [c]onsequently, . . . [the
defendant’s] website cannot provide a basis for an assertion of personal jurisdiction[.]”232

As these cases show, the issue of how websites impact the personal jurisdiction inquiry is
analytically distinct from the issue of how to apply the stream of commerce test to the use of a
distribution network, even when both issues are present in the same case. In both Jennings and
Brown the court looked at a passive website and applied the same test to reach the same
conclusion, even though each jurisdiction applies a different version of the stream of commerce
doctrine. Jennings and Brown did analyze the defendant’s website in different parts of their
analysis, with Jennings analyzing it as another potential contact to support jurisdiction and
Brown analyzing it as a potential ‘something more’ under Justice O’Connor’s version of the
stream of commerce test. However, both courts applied the same, relatively well settled
approach,233 to the actual determination of the website’s impact by looking at objective
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characteristics of the websites in question: specifically, the level of interaction each website
fostered with forum state consumers. Thus, making a choice between the competing approaches
to the stream of commerce from Asahi and Nicastro would make very little difference to the
analysis of internet issues in personal jurisdiction cases.

b. Either Version Of The Stream Of Commerce Test Is Readily Applicable To ECommerce

The concurrence presents a few hypothetical situations that purport to explain why “modern
concerns” must be present in a case deciding the stream of commerce question; however, none of
these is persuasive. The most obvious type of situation where the applicable stream of
commerce test might be outcome determinative in an e-commerce case is one where a
manufacturer sells its product over the Internet through third party such as Amazon or E-Bay.
While this situation on the surface seems to present a novel question of “modern concerns,” it is
actually not fundamentally different from what happened in Nicastro itself.

The manufacturer in such a situation is using Amazon or E-Bay as its’ “distributor” and is
targeting the United States as a whole (since the internet is accessible from anywhere), just as J.
McIntyre did in a more traditional way by hiring its domestic distributor. As demonstrated by
the discussion above, the third party distributor (Amazon or E-Bay) would be subject to
jurisdiction under the approach the Courts of Appeal have taken to Internet commerce in any

Such an analysis would still be distinct from the fundamental question of whether the manufacturing defendant must
intentionally send its products directly to a particular forum, or whether the manufacturing defendant’s knowledge
that a product is likely to end up in that forum is sufficient.

state since they maintain an “interactive” websites. Whether the manufacturer would be subject
to jurisdiction would turn on exactly the same issues as whether J. McIntyre could be subject to
jurisdiction in Nicastro.

While the answers the plurality and the dissent give to that question diverge sharply, the
answer is clear under either approach. A manufacturer who provides its products to a third party
seller who sells those products over the internet to a purchaser in a particular state would not be
subject to personal jurisdiction under the plurality’s approach unless the manufacturer took some
other action to specifically target that particular state (such as advertising its products in that
state or designing its products for use in that state). Conversely, under the dissent’s approach,
since a manufacturer could reasonably expect that a product being sold over the internet by a
third party could end up in any state, the manufacturer would be subject to jurisdiction in any
state where the product was sold, without taking any additional action to target that state. Thus,
the issue presented in Nicastro regarding the stream of commerce test is independent from the
issue of how to deal with issues presented by the internet.

Finally, the concurrence suggests that, especially when applied to an internet based third
party distributor, the plurality and the dissent’s approach could each lead to extreme and
undesirable consequences in particular cases. In critiquing the plurality, the concurrence implies
that a corporation targeting its products “to the world” through a third party internet distributor
could get away with not being subject to jurisdiction in any state because there would be no
purposeful targeting of any given state.234 In critiquing the dissent, the concurrence suggests that
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a hapless small manufacturer, such as an Appalachian potter, who sells its products to a large
national distributor, could be forced to defend lawsuits in “virtually any” jurisdiction in the
United States.235 Neither of these critiques should have prevented the concurrence from
fashioning a rule for at least two reasons.

First, as with any clear legal rule, a clear stream of commerce rule would occasionally
produce results that do not seem fair. Nevertheless, this occasional unfairness is far outweighed
by the unfairness created by a lack of any rule at all. Once a clear rule is set and businesses are
able to structure their primary conduct to avoid or account for the situations where they will be
subject to personal jurisdiction, such ‘unfair’ situations will become less common.

Secondly, and more importantly, both approaches have sufficient flexibility to prevent (or at
least potentially prevent) these seemingly unjust outcomes. Where a corporation employs a
distributor (over the internet or otherwise), to target the United States as a whole, the plurality
specifically left the door open to a legislative solution, suggesting that “[i]t may be that . . .
Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in” federal courts for state law claims
against defendants with sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.236 Thus, to deal
with corporations that target the United States as a whole, Congress could pass a statute
empowering federal courts to hear those cases.237 And, of course, at least in the products liability
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context, in most states the injured consumer would still have the option of suing the
distributor.238

As for the hypothetical Appalachian potter in a world governed by the dissent’s approach, the
concurrence forgets that the stream of commerce test only deals with the first half of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry, whether the defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with the forum
to be subject to jurisdiction in that forum. The second prong of the test, whether the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice would still have to be satisfied even where minimum contacts were established through
the stream of commerce test.

Indeed, Asahi itself is an illustration of this principal. While Justice Brennan took the
broader expectations or awareness based approach to the stream of commerce test, he and the
three other Justices joining him agreed that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was still
inappropriate in that case because it would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice to hale the Japanese part manufacturer into court in California in part because
of the “severe” burden such a defense would place on the defendant.239 Such an approach would
probably yield similar results for the Appalachian potter Justice Breyer’s concurrence is
concerned about.240
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Indeed, as discussed in Part III, supra, the dissent in Nicastro elaborated on this point to suggest a distinction
between “cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro, injured by the activity of a defendant engaged
in interstate or international trade [where jurisdiction presumably would be consistent with fair play and substantial
justice] and . . . cases in which the defendant is a natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal

Thus, either approach to the stream of commerce test would be readily applicable to cases
involving modern technology and would apply to that area in much the same way as they would
apply to cases not involving such technology. Moreover, each test has either built-in or
legislatively available mechanisms to prevent unfair results being created by their application to
e-commerce cases.

VI.

Conclusion

At the heart of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe has always been a concern for
fairness and efficiency. Yet, as the stream of commerce test stands now, personal jurisdiction is
uniquely unfair to certain businesses and consumers who are left in uncertainty as to what
conduct will subject a business to jurisdiction . Such uncertainty is not just unfair; it is also
economically detrimental since so much of today’s commerce flows through international
channels.

While adapting personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to products flowing through the
international “stream of commerce” is a challenge, the Supreme Court laid out two clear and
relatively easily applied approaches to the problem in Asahi and Nicastro. As demonstrated
above, the concurrence’s refusal to choose between the two approaches in Nicastro because of
imagined “modern concerns” was both destructive and unnecessary. Next time the Supreme

involvements are largely home-based, i.e., entities without designes to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant
markets.” 131 S.Ct. at 2804 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that this approach “would, to a
considerable extent, answer the concerns expressed by Justice Breyer.” Id. at 2804 n.18.

Court confronts the stream of commerce, hopefully it will not engage in such faux restraint, and
instead will finally choose one of the clear approaches available to address this problem.

